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COMMUNICATIONS LAW: A REQUIREMENT FOR AFFIRMATIVE
DETERMINATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN RESTRICTING SERVICES BY FACILITIES CERTIFICATION-MCI Telecommunications

Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
781 (1978).
INTRODUCTION

The dynamic technology of the communications industry does not
readily lend itself to the accomplishment of rigid regulatory
objectives.' The rapid evolution of new forms of communication
precludes specific legislative controls2 and hinders administrative efforts to maintain workable regulatory policies in the public interest. 3
In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC," the District of
Columbia Circuit considered the regulatory problems associated with

microwave transmission systems, one of the most dynamic communication technologies. It decided that the public interests supporting
administrative policies in the field should not merely be assumed;
specifically, the public interest in continuing a monopolistic industry

structure must be affirmatively determined before it can operate as an
effective constraint on potential competition. Because the industry
structure in public message telephone service has never been affirmatively determined to be in the public interest, American Telephone
and Telegraph's traditional monopoly in the area has been compromised as a result of the decision. Expanded competition in other forms of
telephone service is also a viable prospect.
THE CASE

Microwave Communications, Inc., obtained a series of facilities
certifications from the Federal Communications Commission, as re1. These objectives are usually stated in broad terms. As an example, it has been
said that "[t]he theory upon which U.S. regulatory actions have been based in the past
is that the establishment (and maintenance) of a regulated monopoly provides more efficient utilization of communications resources, at lowest cost, without the duplication
of carrier facilities associated with unregulated competition." S. MATHISON & P.
WALKER, COMPUTERS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS:

ISSUES IN PUBLIC POLICY 187

(1970).
2. "Presumably Congress could later, in the light of actual regulatory experience, enact more detailed standards to guide the regulatory agency. This was the
hope expressed . . . . The reality has been otherwise." IV B. SCHWARTZ, THE
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

2374 (1973).

3. An overview of the Federal Communications Commission's response to a
revolution in one communication form is provided in D. LEDUC, CABLE TELEVISION
AND THE FCC 5-22 (1973). The author suggests that resource limitations do not allow
the Commission to act, but only to react, as new problems evolve. Id. at 29-31.
4. 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 781 (1978).
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quired of common carriers entering the interstate communication service industry.' The certificates authorized MCI to build point-to-point
microwave transmission systems for the purpose of providing private
line 6 business and data communication services. In September, 1974,
7
MCI filed revisions to its applicable interstate service tariffs, propos5. The facilities certification section of the Communications Act, section 214,
provides the most direct regulatory power held by the Commission. Section 214(a)

states in part:
No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line, or shall acquire or
operate any line, or extension thereof, or shall engage in transmission over or by
means of such additional or extended line, unless and until there shall first have
been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public
convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation,
or construction and operation, of such additional or extended line....
47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1970). Section 214(c) adds in part:
The Commission shall have power to issue such certificate as applied for, or refuse
to issue it, or to issue it for a portion or portions of a line, or extension thereof, or
discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of service, described in the application,
or for the partial exercise only of such right or privilege, and may attach to the issuance of the certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public
convenience and necessity may require.
47 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1970).

6. Private line service is "[a] service whereby facilities for communication between two or more designated points are set aside for the exclusive use or availability
for use of a particular customer and authorized users during stated periods of time."
47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1977). Private line service is to be distinguished from public message
service which is "[a] service whereby facilities are offered to the public for communication between all points served by a carrier or by interconnected carriers on a nonexclusive message by message basis, contemplating a separate connection for each occasion of use." Id.
Private lines are not synonymous with private systems. Private systems essentially
provide private line services to their users, which include government, railroads, and
other large businesses, but a major difference lies in the private ownership of facilities.
See note 24 infra.
7. Tariffs are the published schedules of carrier rates and services, together with
explanations and limitations on the manner of customer use. The tariff mechanism of
the Communications Act, sections 203-205, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 203-205 (West 1962 &
Supp. 1978), like the facilities certification section, is a major source of the Commission's regulatory authority. Unlike the facilities certification section, the Commission's
regulation of tariffs is generally post facto. Section 203(a) states in part:
Every common carrier... shall, within such reasonable time as the Commission
shall designate, file with the Commission and print and keep open for public inspection schedules showing all charges ... for interstate and foreign wire or radio
communication ... and showing the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges.
47 U.S.C.A. § 203(a) (1970). Section 204(a) states in part:
Whenever there is filed with the Commission any new or revised charge, classification, regulation, or practice, the Commission may ... enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness thereof; and pending such hearing . . . may suspend the
operation of such charge, classification, regulation, or practice, in whole or in
part but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would
otherwise go into effect; and after full hearing the Commission may make such
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/10
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ing rates for a new package of communication services called Execunet. 8 The revised tariffs became effective on October 1, 1974.
In early 1975, American Telephone and Telegraph 9 complained to
the FCC that Execunet was not a private line, but an interstate public
message telephone service'" which MCI could not properly offer.
Following a period of informal ex parte consideration of the complaint, the FCC forwarded AT&T's allegation to MCI for comment. In
July, 1975, after a series of written responses by MCI, the FCC rejected the revised tariffs and ordered MCI to cease and desist offering
Execunet service." This decision was based on the private line purpose
of MCI's facilities which had been expressly written into several of its
facilities certifications.2
order with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after
such charge, classification, regulation, or practice had become effective.
47 U.S.C.A. § 204(a) (West Supp. 1978). Section 205(a) states:
Whenever . . . the Commission shall be of [the] opinion that any charge,
classification, regulation, or practice of any carrier or carriers is or will be in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, the Commission is authorized and
empowered to determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable charge
or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, charge or charges to
be thereafter observed, and what classification, regulation, or practice is or will be
just, fair, and reasonable, to be thereafter followed, and to make an order that
the carrier or carriers shall cease and desist from such violation ..
47 U.S.C.A. § 205(a) (1970).
8. With Execunet a subscriber using any push-button telephone (or rotary dial
phone and tone generator) can reach any telephone in a distant city served by MCI
simply by dialing a local MCI number followed by an access code and the number
in the distant city. Execunet customers are billed for each call on a time and
* distance basis, subject to a monthly minimum.
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 367 (footnote omitted). "In
other words, none of the MCI plant, or indeed any of the plant used in completing the
call, is dedicated to the use of a particular customer during any specified time; rather it
is available upon demand." MCI Telecommunications Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25, 26 n. 1
(1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct.
781 (1978).
9. AT&T, United States Independent Telephone Association, Data Transmission
Company, and Southern Pacific Communications Company ultimately joined as intervenors in the case. Of the $35,639,012,902.00 in operating revenues received by the
62 national telephone service carriers during 1976, $33,506,601,269.00 went to AT&T,
its subsidiaries, and the associated companies that comprise the Bell System. FCC,
STATISTICS OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS 29 (1976).
10. See notes 6 & 8 supra. This note assumes, as the FCC ultimately determined,
that Execunet is a public message telephone service in competition with AT&T's MTS
and WATS services. But the FCC's determination was contested throughout by MCI
and, as an issue of fact, is very close. See Vol. 1 Supplemental Appendix at 704-10,
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), for a detailed
comparison of the characteristics of Execunet and MTS, prepared by MCI, which indicates significant differences in the nature of the services. The circuit court adopted
the FCC's determination.
11. MCI Telecommunications Corp., No. 75-799 (F.C.C. July 2, 1975) (letter
order).
12. In the various Commission orders granting section 214 applications of the
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MCI petitioned for review of the cease and desist order in the
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, alleging
3
various procedural violations by the FCC. The court stayed the
order in part and, on the Commission's motion, remanded the proceedings for reconsideration. On remand, the Commission took written
submissions and heard oral arguments, but denied MCI's motion for
an evidentiary hearing. In July, 1976, it once more rejected the Execunet tariff." This time, however, it was evident that express private
line restrictions could not be found in all of MCI's facilities certifications. The cease and desist order, therefore, was alternatively affirmed
on the basis of an implicitly developed Commission policy limiting
5
MCI, and carriers in its class, to private line services. MCI again
petitioned for review.
THE DECISION

The circuit court reversed the decision of the FCC and once again
remanded the case for reconsideration. In its analysis, the court took a
limiting view of the FCC's statutory authority and of the purported exercise of that authority by which the Commission -believed it had
created an enforceable policy against Execunet.
The court initially decided that it is within the Commission's power
to reject a tariff, if the tariff offers a service for which prior approval
MCI carriers to construct and operate facilities (e.g., 32 F.C.C.2d 36 (1971), FCC
72-456 (May 26, 1972), FCC 72-832 (September 22, 1972), FCC 72-852 (September
29, 1972)), appears language similar to the following:
"The service proposed is essentially private line for the transmission of data,
fascimile, control, remote metering, voice and communications."
Id. at 2-3.
13. The alleged procedural violations were that "the Commission had failed to
comply with Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, its own rules governing informal complaints, its own rules governing ex parte contacts, Sections 204 and 205 of
the Communications Act, and the Due Process Clause." MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 369 (citation and footnotes omitted). The court's final
determination was essentially procedural. However, despite MCI's insistence, it ignored these particular issues. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 14-35; Supplemental
Brief for Petitioners at 27-38, 53-65; Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1-10, 23-32, MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 369.
14. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25 (1976), rev'd, 561 F.2d 365
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 781 (1978).
15. The Commission asserted that the implicitly developed policy was apparent in
decision in Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870
landmark
its
(1971), aff'd sub nom. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975), in which the common policies regarding expanded competitive entry in the microwave communications field were extensively addressed:
Our discussion in the Specialized Common Carrier decision makes it quite clear
that we intended and did open competition only in the limited portion of AT&T's

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/10
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is required and approval has not been obtained.' 6 But it also decided
that, at the threshold, the Commission's authority to create a prior approval requirement for new services is in itself very limited. Under section 214(c) of the Communications Act, the FCC does have authority
to create service restrictions "as in its judgment the public convenience
and necessity may require." 7 The exercise of that authority, however,
deviates from a general congressional scheme of tariff freedom, under
sections 203-205,'8 and limited facilities regulation, under section
214(a).I 9 Therefore, "the Commission must strictly follow the terms of
Section 214(c), and it cannot impose any such restriction unless it has
affirmatively determined that 'the public convenience and necessity
[so] require.'
The source of the phrase "affirmatively determined," and a lucid
definition of its operative meaning, are not explicitly provided in the
opinion. Nonetheless, the court did impliedly equate the lack of "an
affirmative finding" of public interest with a "failure to consider the
public interest,"'" and decided that the Commission's service restrictions here would not meet the affirmative determination requirements
of section 214(c).
The court then turned to the purported private line restriction of
MCI and found that this restriction was never affirmatively determined
to be in the public interest.2 2 MCI had proposed only private line service when obtaining its facilities certifications. In addition, only
private line services were brought before the FCC by carriers in MCI's
class at the time that the implicit restriction policy was developed.2 3
Together, these facts could be argued in support of the proposition
that competition in private line service had been determined to be in
the public interest; but the extended proposition that competition only
in private line service is in the public interest does not necessarily
follow. Without an affirmative determination of the latter proposition,
MCI could not be restricted to private line services.
and Western Union's business represented by private line services. For example,
our analysis of possible revenue diversion (29 F.C.C.2d at 911-914) dealt only with
the private 'line revenues of these two carriers. Further, we recognized that the
SCC would not compete directly with the established carriers' message services.
MCI Telecommunications Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d at 36.
16. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 374; accord, Associated
Press v. FCC, 448 F.2d 1095, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 214(c). See note 5 supra.
18. See note 7 supra.
19. See note 5 supra.
20. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 377.
21. Id. at 378.
22. Id. at 379.
23. See note 15 supra.
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THE ANALYSIS

The following analysis is generally framed in the same manner as
the circuit court's decision. The issues for consideration are: (1)
whether the Commission has authority to restrict service offerings over
authorized facilities without an affirmative determination of the public
interest in such restriction; and (2) whether the Commission had affirmatively determined that the restriction of MCI's facilities to private line
service would be in the public interest. Because of the conclusions
reached below, especially with respect to the extent of the Commission's authority, it is appropriate to address the issues in reverse order
and first determine the nature of the purported restriction of MCI.
A.

The Restriction of MCI.

Microwave transmission was developed as a weapons technology
during the Second World War. AT&T's exploitation of the technology
for long distance communications, immediately after the war, was
largely limited to high density routes between major population
centers. Right-of-way companies, and others similarly situated with
available capital and sufficient private intercommunication needs,"
soon thereafter began the arduous process of securing FCC certification for privately owned microwave facilities. The FCC's reaction to
applications for private systems during this period was one of reluctant
accomodation2 5 partly founded in a fear that the private systems would
significantly divert revenues supporting AT&T's development of
microwave for public telephone service. Licenses for private systems
were issued, but on an experimental rather than permanent basis "6 and
subject to revocation if the fear of "cream skimming ' ' "7 materialized.
Obstacles to the development of private systems were lifted in 1959
as a result of the Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890
Mc. decision. 28 The Commission there decided that the cream skimming threat Was not significant because the number of private systems,
24. "The major prerequisites for the construction of a private microwave system
are heavy requirements for point-to-point carrier capacity over a given route plus the
financial ability to invest large amounts in the system's construction in addition to its
operating expenses." S. MATHISON & P. WALKER, supra note 1, at 182.
25. M. IRWIN, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 79 (1971).
26. K. BORCHARDT, STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 37 (1970).
27. Id. See also M. IRWIN, supra note 25, at 79-80. The cream skimming
metaphor is particularly concerned with the competitive drain- of revenues from high
density routes. It was feared that AT&T would be left with only low volume routes,

where the cost of service was higher per unit, but where the price had been maintained
artificially low under AT&T's nationwide rate averaging structure.

28.

27 F.C.C. 359 (1959).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/10
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and consequent loss of AT&T revenues, would still be limited by
capital requirements and interconnection prohibitions. 2 9 But the determinative conclusion in liberalizing access to microwave frequencies was
not minimization of the adverse effects of private system competition
with AT&T's existing monopoly in public telephone service. Rather,
the positive effects of competition in the areas of microwave
technology which AT&T was neglecting were dispositive.3 0
This element of innovative impetus provided by liberalized licensing later became the focal consideration in erosion of AT&T's
monopoly position in private line service. In 1964, MCI applied to the
FCC for permission to build and operate 11 microwave transmission
facilities between St. Louis and Chicago. MCI's proposal was not for a
private system. Instead, the facilities were to be used for business and
data communications by multiple subscribers whose individual communication needs were not sufficient to justify the capital investment
required for individual private systems. In this regard, MCI's position
would be comparable to that of AT&T as a common carrier of private
line communications.
In 1969, the FCC granted facility certifications for the proposal in
Microwave Communications, Inc.3" However, the Commission clearly
defined MCI's new position as that of a "limited common carrier."'
Again, the dispositive issue in the grant was not the possibility of competition with AT&T but the opportunity for introducing new services
which AT&T was not providing:
Lower rates for the services offered is not the sole basis for our determination that MCI has demonstrated a need for the proposed facilities,
but the flexibility available to subscribers, and the sharing and the parttime features of the proposal have been considered to be significant factors as well. Here, the potential demand for the new service is not
generated solely by reason of lower rates for a like service, but because
29. A microwave relay system only provides for communication between the
relays. Access to the relay system, by telephone apparatus at each end point, must be
accomplished by interconnection through landlines or local exchange service. This
presented no problem for private systems because the end point telephones were
privately owned and could be connected through landlines. However, competition with
AT&T on a common carrier basis would not be feasible without interconnection
through local exchange facilities. Most of these facilities belonged to AT&T and its
tariffs prohibited interconnection until 1969. S. MATHISON & P. WALKER, supra note
1, at 104.
30. "There is yet another consideration which impels us to our determination. We
feel that expanded eligibility will afford a competitive spur in the manufacturing of
equipment and in the development of the communications art." Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359, 414. (1959).
31. 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969).
32. Id. at 953.
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there is a "need for service which, if not met, would result in a serious
deficiency in the communication services available to the public." It may
be, as the telephone companies and Western Union argue, that some
business will be diverted from the existing carriers upon the grant of
MCI's applications, but that fact provides no sufficient basis for depriving a segment of the public of the benefits of a new and different
service.33
Within two years after the decision in Microwave Communications, Inc., the FCC was forced to elaborate on the principles behind
expanding participation in private line microwave communications.
Over 1700 facilities certification applications, including additional requests by MCI and 17 of its affiliates, were pending before the Commission at the time of the landmark Specialized Common CarrierServices3" decision. In resolving common policy and procedural questions,
prior to consideration of the individual applications, the Commission
determined "that a general policy in favor of the entry of new carriers
in the specialized communications field would serve the public interest,
convenience, and necessity." 3"
Although the Commission did not explicitly define "specialized
communications," each of the 46 proposals involved was for private
line business and data communications services to be offered on a
limited common carrier basis. Once more, the Commission emphasized
that the introduction of new services in this area, and not competition
with AT&T's existing public telephone services, was the primary objective." The Ninth Circuit's affirmation of Specialized Common Carrier
Services, in Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission v.
FCC,37 similarly defined the restricted scope of the new entrants' services,3 8 and interpretation by the Third Circuit affirmed the interconnection rights of the specialized carriers insofar as interconnection
39
would serve the limited private line purposes of their facilities.
Throughout the period of policy development with respect to
microwave facilities authorizations, therefore, expanded participation
33. Id. at 960-61 (citation omitted).
34. 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Washington Utils. & Transp.
Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
35. Id. at 920.
36. Id. at 875.
37. 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
38. "The business involved is that of providing specialized private or leased line
communications services through microwave transmission facilities, as distinguished
from public exchange and long distance toll telephone service." Id. at 1155.
39. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1026 (1975). See note 29 supra, concerning the interconnection problem. The FCC had
already determined in Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), that
private line interconnection would be in the public interest. Id. at 965.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/10
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has been allowed in order to develop new types of services. Formal
determinations of the public interest during certification proceedings
were appropriately directed primarily toward evaluation of the effect
of expanded participation in the types of service contemplated.
The assumption underlying the limitation of these public interest
determinations was that competition with AT&T, in public message
telephone service, would not occur. This assumption is evident in the
recognition of barriers to entry in Allocation of Frequencies in the
Bands Above 890 Mc.," the characterization of MCI as a "limited
common carrier" in Microwave Communications, Inc.,4 1 and the
restricted scope of the Specialized Common Carrier Services,2 decision. Moreover, in each step of the expanded participation policy the
Commission thought it necessary to formally determine that allowance
of service considered would present no significant cream skimming
threat to AT&T's public message telephone services. Therefore, it is
also a posterioriapparent that the Commission, at least implicitly, had
assumed that the occurrence of direct competition would adversely affect AT&T, and thereby adversely affect the provision of nationwide
public telephone service.
The District of Columbia Circuit rightly decided in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC that these assumptions were never investigated and could not therefore, in the court's view, be considered
as affirmative determinations of the public interest involved.
Nonetheless, these assumptions were influential in the Commission's
controlled abandonment of the preexisting AT&T monopoly in private
line telephone service.
It follows, then, that the restriction of MCI, that may be construed
from the existence of these assumptions, is ineffective if it must be
preceded by an affirmative determination of the public interest. But
the restriction, while not based on an affirmatively determined public
interest, is not a sudden invention of the FCC based on a public interest fortuitously discovered for the sole purpose of restraining MCI
in the instant case. The effectiveness of the restriction therefore
depends on the extent of the, FCC's authority to restrict absent an affirmative determination of the public interest.
B.

Principlesof Tariff Freedom and Limited FacilitiesRegulation.

The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the FCC has no
authority to restrict services that may be offered over authorized
40. 27
41. 18
42. 29
Comm'n v.

F.C.C. 359 (1959).
F.C.C.2d 953 (1969).
F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Washington Utils. & Transp.
F.C.C., 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
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facilities without an affirmative determination of the public interests

supporting such restriction. If this conclusion is correct, then the
court's decision is also correct because there has been no affirmative
determination of the public interest in restricting MCI. If, however,
the FCC's power is not limited in the fashion suggested by the court

then the lack of an affirmative determination of the public interest in
restricting MCI to private line services might not have been fatal to the
enforceability of such restriction.'"

The major source of FCC authority over communications common
carriers is Title II of the Communications Act," initially passed by
Congress in 1934. The legislative record of the Act is sparse, due to the
5
brief period of time that the bill was before each house,' and to ad-

mitted congressional ignorance on the subject of the legislation."

Nonetheless, the record and the regulatory scheme of the Act itself do

indicate to some extent the intent of Congress in creating an administrative regulatory authority over communications. The District of
Columbia Circuit's limited view of FCC authority was reached by a

synthesis of the congressional purposes it perceived in the tariff and
facilities certification provisions of the Act.
First, based on the genesis of the tariff mechanism, the court found
a congressional intent to discourage Commission interference in carrier
initiated tariff revisions. The tariff system in the Communications Act

was adapted from the Interstate Commerce Act.'7 The Interstate Com-

merce Act tariff provisions have been consistently interpreted as allow43. The court stated that its reversal of the Commission's orders should not be
construed as a determination that the public interest would be either for or against the
private line restriction. That determination was left to the Commission on remand in
the event it elected to further investigate the matter. MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 380. The Commission has opened a rulemaking proceeding, MTS
and .WATS Market Structure, 43 Fed. Reg. 46, 9505 (1978), to perform the investigation.
44. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-223 (West 1962 & Supp. 1978).
45. The Dill bill was debated only briefly in the Senate, the entire debate taking
place on May 15, 1934 . . . .In the House, the debate was even briefer being
limited to only two hours on June 2, 1934. The shortness of the debate in both
houses is most striking, bearing in mind the importance of the bill, which worked
a complete transformation in the regulation of communications.
IV B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 2375-76.
46. As a Congressman, he conceded, he knew little about radio and the problems involved in regulating it and other communications. The only solution was
to form a commission to gather information in the field. It was much safer to give
the commission powers "than to attempt with what little knowledge we have to
lay down a code which will cover all sorts of conditions and all sorts of individual
practices."
IV B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 2374 (quoting Congressman Schuyler Merritt).
47. 49 U.S.C. §§ 15(1), 15(7) (1970). See S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1934); H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d-Sess. 5-6 (1934).
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ing common carriers in commerce to freely initiate new rates and services without prior approval of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.' 8 The Second Circuit, in AT&Tv. FCC,'9 applied this interpretation directly to the similar provisions of the Communications,
Act, with a caveat against FCC violation of the apparent congressional
purpose:
In enacting Sections 203-205 of the Communications Act, Congress intended a specific scheme for carrier initiated rate revisions. A balance
was achieved after a careful compromise. The Commission is not free to
circumvent or ignore that balance. Nor may the Commission in effect
rewrite this statutory scheme on the basis of its own conception of the
equities of a particular situation."0
Despite the purpose perceived, the Second Circuit did permit the FCC
to erect prior approval requirements if expressly provided for
elsewhere in the Act. 5 '
Second, because AT&T v. FCC involved only prior approval for
rate revisions, expansion of this noninterference principle to new services, when offered over existing facilities, was left to the court in MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, as a question of first impression.
The involvement of facilities necessitated an interpretation of section
214 and its effect on the principle of carrier freedom in tariffs.
In this regard, the court viewed section 214(a) 2 as merely another
example of the noninterference principle which had been promulgated
earlier in AT&T v. FCC:
Section 214 establishes the Commission's regulatory charter over entry
into the common carrier communications field and states that no carrier
shall construct, extend, or acquire a line unless the Commission has first
affirmatively determined that such entry would be in the public interest.
The primary purpose of Section 214(a) is prevention of unnecessary
duplication of facilities, not regulation of services. Because of this, Section '214 would appear to have a limited office with respect to regulation
of service offerings on existing lines. 3
Finally, section 214(c) ' was recognized by the court as an express
source of authority for the type of service regulation sought by the
48. See, e.g., United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Arrow Transp.
Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 658 (1963).
49. 487 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1973).

50. Id. at 880 (footnote omitted).
51.

Id. at 876-81.

52. See note 4 supra.
53. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 375 (emphasis in
original).
54. See note 5 supra.
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FCC." Nonetheless, by relating the limited purpose of facilities regulation in section 214(a) to the principle of tariff freedom embodied in
sections 203-205, the court found an implicit congressional plan to
limit Commission authority in the regulation of services. Because the
exercise of section 214(c) power would necessarily be an exceptional
measure deviating from this congressional plan, it would be properly
exercised only by strict compliance with its terms. This would include
an affirmative determination of the public need for a section 214(c)
restriction.
C.

Questioning the Principles

The congressional plan perceived by the court in support of limited
section 214(c) power is suspect. It is logically derived from two abiding
congressional intentions. But these congressional intentions, as
developed by the court, are each in turn questionable. The specific
questions raised are: (1) did Congress intend, in section 214(a), that
facilities be regulated to prevent duplication without consideration of
the services offered; and (2) did Congress intend, in sections 203-205,
that carriers have absolute freedom in initiating tariff revisions.
First, section 214(a) should not be understood as only a purposeless
preoccupation by Congress with preventing duplicated facilities. The
ultimate purpose of the provision is to prevent the higher cost of service that results from duplicated facilities." At the threshold, then, the
exclusion of service considerations in facilities regulation is contrary to
congressional intent, rather than compliant with it. Further, in
Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. FCC" the practical significance of service
considerations in the facilities certification process was outlined:
When the FCC considers an application for certification of a new line, it
must start from the situation as it then exists, and must apply the
statutory standard to determine whether indeed the public convenience
and necessity requires more or better service. If it determines that more
or additional competitive service would be in the public interest, then it
can consider how much added service is necessary and finally to whom
the opportunity for providing service should be awarded."
The court, in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, saw this as
"merely a matter of fact observation."" If service considerations during a facilities certification would be a basis for regulating services not
55.
56.
sequent
57.
58.
59.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 377.
"This section is designed to prevent useless duplication of facilities with conhigher charges upon the users of services." 78 CONG. REC. 10314 (1934).
498 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 776.
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 376.
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then considered, then the final provision of section 214(a) would be
nullified by requiring a certification where the adequacy and quality of
existing services were not impaired.60 The court, instead, believed that
a determination of the public necessity for a facility would not be
altered if additional services were later provided over the same facility,
because "the public need that justified construction of facilities will
still be met and there is no sense in which those facilities would have
become needlessly duplicative.""
The court's analysis is incomplete. MCI's facilities do not appear
duplicative insofar as they are still necessary to provide MCI's private
line services. However, either MCI's or AT&T's facilities are
duplicative in the provision of public message telephone service. The
users of MTS-type service, whose requirements were formerly served
by AT&T, do not now need one of the two facilities. Hence, duplication of service does, in a sense, duplicate facilities and it can be anticipated that the allocated cost of the unneeded facilities will eventually
be absorbed by public message telephone users.
Second, the congressional plan of tariff freedom as perceived by
the Second Circuit, in AT&T v. FCC,62 is unsound. Legislative history
of the Communications Act reveals nothing to support, or contest, an
"intended . . . specific scheme . . . achieved after a careful compromise." 3 Insofar as congressional intent in the Communications
Act can be inferred from the Interstate Commerce Act, the principle of absolute carrier freedom in tariff revisions might be maintained
"
in communications. But, in General Telephone Co. v. United States, "
the Fifth Circuit determined that the clearest pervading purpose of
Congress to be found in the Communications Act was to endow the
new Commission with sufficiently flexible powers to deal with the
dynamics of an evolving communications technology. It was therefore
60. The relevant wording is: "[N]othing in this section shall be construed to require a certificate or other authorization from the Commission for any... changes...
other than new construction, which will not impair the adequacy or quality of service
provided." 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1970).
The issue whether Execunet would impair MCI's existing private line services was
never raised by the parties and only casually considered, and dismissed, by the court.
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. F.C.C., 561 F.2d at 375 n.51. The issue deserved
more consideration. Because microwave transmission facilities do not have infinite circuit capacity, Execunet would necessarily displace MCI's private line services at capacity.
61. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 376.
62. 487 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1973).
63. Id. at 880. Based on the length of time of congressional consideration alone,
this characterization of the Act appears inaccurate. See notes 46 & 47 supra.
64. 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971) (involving similarity of the facilities certification
provisions).
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held that, in interpreting certain provisions of the Communications
Act, although drawn from and nearly identical to provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, the FCC would have broader authority than
the ICC and would not be restricted to a course of action that had
been dictated by national transportation policy.'
The broad authority attributed to the Commission in General
Telephone Co. v. United States is not an isolated concession. Rather,
it is representative of a tradition of judicial deference to the Commission's determinations, and the presumption of correctness that attaches to them." Commission actions in patent violation of the Act, or
actions which are not pursuant to its regulatory functions, are among
the few recognizable exceptions to this broad construction of Commission authority. 7 The Commission has otherwise been allowed to reject
tariffs with only a cursory economic analysis," permit experimental
services in the absence of a "compelling showing of legislative prohibition," ' I 9 and give retroactive effect to its rules despite detrimental carrier reliance. 0 It has generally been recognized that, in view of the congressional inability to identify new forms of communication and to
continually modify statutory procedures for dealing with them, the
FCC should be entitled to great latitude in coping with their development."
The limiting congressional plan in the Communications Act, as
perceived by the court in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, is
contrary to the consistent construction of broad Commission authority.
Congress simply intended to delegate sufficient authority for effective
administrative regulation of a technology which could not be regulated
by legislative means. The reading of section 214(c) to require an affirmative determination of the public need for service restrictions must
therefore fail with the misperceived congressional plan. Instead, based
on the breadth of the congressionally delegated authority, the reasoned
propriety of judicial deference to the Commission's actions, the impropriety of transferring congressional intent from transportation
regulation to communications regulation, and the purpose behind
facilities certification, it should be enough that "in [the Commission's]
65. Id. at 856.
66. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 948 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
67, See, e.g., Daly v. United States, 286 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1961) ("plainly
erroneous" requirement).
68. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1055 (4th Cir. 1977).
69. United Tel. Workers v. FCC, 436 F.2d 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
70. General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 864 (5th Cir. 1971).
71. Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
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judgment the public convenience and necessity may require"" restriction of MCI's facilities to private line service.
CONCLUSION

The implicit limitation of MCI to private line service, through
evolution of the microwave regulatory policy, was not based on a formal determination of the public interests involved. But the assumptions underlying the controlled opening of private line microwave to
common carrier competition should be recognized as Commission
judgments regarding the public interests involved in public message
telephone service competition. The final explicit restriction of MCI's
facilities to private line service, in the contested Commission orders,
was nothing less than reiteration of those Commission judgments.
Under the terms of section 214(c), the Commission orders were proper
and the court's reversal was therefore unwarranted.
Finally, it should be noted that the Commission orders were essentially viewed by the court as protectionist actions, promotive of
AT&T's private financial interests in its preexisting public message
telephone service monopoly. 3 In maintaining this view, the court had
to ignore the trend of Commission fostered competitive expansion in
private line service, in which AT&T had also previously held a
monopoly with vested financial interests. An enlightened approach to
the trend would recognize that the Commission's controlled opening of
private line service to competition is in compliance with the congressional mandate of regulating "so as to make available so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." 74 There is no reason to believe
that when, in the Commission's judgment, the controlled opening of
public message telephone service to competition could be accomplished
in compliance with the terms of the mandate, competition would not
have been fostered.
Paul GerardHallinan
72. 47 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1970).
73. [T]he Commission must be ever mindful that, just as it is not free to create
competition for competition's sake, it is not free to propagate monopoly for
monopoly's sake. The ultimate test of industry structure in the communications
common carrier field must be the public interest, not the private financial interests
of those who have until now enjoyed the fruits of de facto monopoly.
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d at 380.
74. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
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